Both Sides of the \u3cem\u3eRock\u3c/em\u3e: Justice Gorsuch and the \u3cem\u3eSeminole Rock\u3c/em\u3e Deference Doctrine by Leske, Kevin O.
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law 
Volume 7 Issue 2 
2018 
Both Sides of the Rock: Justice Gorsuch and the Seminole Rock 
Deference Doctrine 
Kevin O. Leske 
Barry University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Judges Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin O. Leske, Both Sides of the Rock: Justice Gorsuch and the Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine, 7 
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 281 (2018). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal/vol7/iss2/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative 
Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-2\MEA202.txt unknown Seq: 1 26-APR-18 10:20
BOTH SIDES OF THE ROCK: JUSTICE
GORSUCH AND THE SEMINOLE ROCK
DEFERENCE DOCTRINE
Kevin O. Leske*
Despite being early in his tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Neil
Gorsuch has already made his presence known. His October 16, 2017 statement
respecting the denial of certiorari in Scenic America, Inc. v. Department of
Transportation garnered significant attention within the legal community.
Joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, Justice Gorsuch
questioned whether the Court’s bedrock 2-part test from Chevron, U.S.A. v.
NRDC—whereby courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguous statutory term—should apply in the case.
Justice Gorsuch’s criticism of the Chevron doctrine was not a surprise. In
the months leading up to his confirmation hearing, legal scholars pored over his
opinions while he was a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
and they had already unearthed his discomfort with the Chevron doctrine. Simi-
larly, through an analysis of his originalism ideology and textualist approach to
judicial decision-making, they have attempted to predict how Justice Gorsuch will
decide future cases in other important areas of the law.
To date, however, Justice Gorsuch’s view on the Seminole Rock deference
doctrine has gone unexamined by scholars. Known as Chevron’s “doctrinal
cousin,” the Seminole Rock doctrine directs federal courts to defer to an admin-
istrative agency’s  interpretation of its own regulation unless such interpretation
“is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Especially given the
profound practical importance of the doctrine in our administrative state and the
Court’s recent interest in it, an assessment of Justice Gorsuch’s view is not merely
academic.
This essay provides that assessment. First, the essay  examines the Seminole
Rock deference doctrine and explores the Court’s recent interest in the doctrine.
Part II analyzes Justice Gorsuch’s likely view on the Seminole Rock doctrine by
examining key Tenth Circuit opinions that will influence his view on Seminole
Rock while on the Supreme Court. The essay conludes that although Justice Gor-
susch would likely be very skeptical of Seminole Rock, he should ultimately
choose to retain the doctrine provided that the Court continues to provide safe-
guards that would mitigate or even mute any perceived over-reach that the appli-
cation of Seminole Rock allows in our administrative state.
* Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law. I dedicate this essay to
my late father, Gary S. Leske, who provided life-long guidance, support, and inspiration. I
am grateful to the editors and staff of the Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative
Law for their excellent work.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite being early in his tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice
Neil Gorsuch has already made his presence known. His October 16, 2017
statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Scenic America, Inc. v. De-
partment of Transportation garnered significant attention within the legal
community.1 Joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito,
Justice Gorsuch questioned whether the Court’s bedrock test from Chevron,
U.S.A. v. NRDC2—whereby courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term—should apply in the case.3
Justice Gorsuch’s criticism of the Chevron doctrine was not a surprise.
In the months leading up to his confirmation hearing, legal scholars pored
over his opinions while he was a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, and they had already unearthed his past discomfort with the
Chevron doctrine. Similarly, through an analysis of his constitutional
originalism ideology and textualist approach to statutory construction, they
have attempted to predict how Justice Gorsuch will decide future cases in
important areas of the law.4
1. Scenic Am., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 583 U.S. ___ (2017) (No. 16–739) (Gorsuch,
J., denying cert.).
2. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. Scenic Am., 583 U. S. ____ (No. 16–739); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
4. See, e.g., Philip J. McAndrews III, What SCOTUS Nominee Neil Gorsuch’s Interpreta-
tion of Chevron Could Mean for Environmental Administrative Law, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. ON-
LINE (Mar. 5, 2017), https://gelr.org/2017/03/05/what-scotus-nominee-neil-gorsuchs-interpre
tation-of-chevron-could-mean-for-environmental-administrative-law/ (predicting that “[a]
lack of Chevron deference to agency interpretations would greatly impact environmental
agencies’ abilities to apply statutory directives in a way that ensures their enforcement pow-
ers span the wide range of potential environmental issues with which they are tasked to
administer.”); David J. Reiss, Gorsuch, CFPB and Future of the Administrative State (Brooklyn
Law Sch. Legal Studies, Paper No. 483, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2915266 (predict-
ing Justice Gorsuch’s impact on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); David Feder,
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To date, however, Justice Gorsuch’s view on the Seminole Rock defer-
ence doctrine has gone unexamined by scholars. Known as Chevron’s “doctri-
nal cousin,” the Seminole Rock doctrine directs federal courts to defer to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation unless such in-
terpretation “is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”5 This
is unsurprising, since the Seminole Rock deference regime has not received
anywhere near the scrutiny applied to the Chevron doctrine.6
So why should we be concerned with the Seminole Rock standard and
Justice Gorsuch’s view on the doctrine? Given the paramount importance of
regulations in our massive administrative state, the application of Seminole
Rock doctrine has profound consequences to private parties.7 As Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts recently observed, Seminole Rock questions go “to the
heart of administrative law” and “arise as a matter of course on a regular
basis” during judicial review.8 Thus, whether the Court continues to apply
the standard to agency interpretations in these cases is extremely
significant.
The Administrative Law Originalism of Neil Gorsuch, YALE J. ON REG. (Nov. 21, 2016), http://
yalejreg.com/nc/the-administrative-law-originalism-of-neil-gorsuch/ (analyzing “three of
Judge Gorsuch’s recent and noteworthy administrative law opinions, with an eye toward the
rigorous originalism that motivated them.”).
5. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). Recently, Seminole
Rock deference has been called “Auer deference” because of the case of Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 461 (1997), where the Court applied and affirmed the Seminole Rock doctrine. It
remains unknown why the courts and the legal community refer now to Auer deference,
instead of Seminole Rock deference. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chev-
ron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1088-89, 1089 n.26 (2008). Justice Scalia, who wrote the
majority opinion in Auer invoking the doctrine, would later question the doctrine. See Kevin
O. Leske, A Rock Unturned: Justice Scalia’s (Unfinished) Crusade against the Seminole Rock
Deference Doctrine, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2017) [hereinafter Leske, A Rock Unturned].
6. Kevin O. Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place: A New Approach to
Agency Deference, 46 CONN. L. REV. 227, 229 (2013) [hereinafter Leske, Between] (asserting
that unlike Chevron, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine has “gone largely unexamined”);
Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency
Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 99 (2000) (The Seminole Rock deference
doctrine has “lurked beneath the surface and evaded scholarly and judicial criticism.”); cf.
Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 587, 589 (1984) (“Although commentators have lavished attention on the
subject of statutory construction, they have virtually ignored the problem of how to interpret
regulations.”).
7. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Inter-
pretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 614-15 (1996) (highlighting that Seminole
Rock deference mandates close attention because agency rules affect the public’s legal rights
more directly than statutes).
8. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
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In addition, there are constitutional and practical problems with the
existing standard. Because the Seminole Rock standard is highly deferential
to agencies, scholars have referred to it as “controlling” deference because
the standard essentially mandates that a court accept the agency’s interpre-
tation of an ambiguous regulatory provision.9 Seen in this light, some schol-
ars argue that the doctrine raises separation of powers concerns.
For example, in his groundbreaking law review article on the Seminole
Rock doctrine, Professor John F. Manning asserts that granting an adminis-
trative agency deference under Seminole Rock effectively empowers the
agency to make the law and then interpret that “law.”10 In other words, an
agency can first promulgate regulations, which have the force of law, and
then in essence decide what the regulation means because the agency re-
ceives controlling deference for its subsequent interpretation.11 This power
of “self-interpretation,”12 as seen by Manning, “contradicts a major premise
of our constitutional scheme and of contemporary separation of powers case
law—that a fusion of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially dangerous
to our liberties.”13 Indeed, standing alone, law-exposition by an agency runs
counter to the bedrock principle that “[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”14
9. As in my past scholarship on the Seminole Rock doctrine, see Leske, Between, supra
note 6, at 230, and Kevin O. Leske, Splits in the Rock: The Conflicting Interpretations of the
Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 789
(2014) [hereinafter Leske, Splits in the Rock], I will refer to Seminole Rock deference as “con-
trolling” deference because it echoes the Court’s view that the agency’s “administrative inter-
pretation . . . becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.” Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414; accord Weaver, supra note 6, at 591 (calling
certain deference rules, including Seminole Rock’s, “controlling” because they are outcome
determinative).
Other scholars have called it “binding deference,” which is a phrase interchangeable
with “controlling deference.” See Manning, supra note 7, at 617 (discussing the concept of
“binding deference” whereby a reviewing court must “accept an agency’s reasonable interpre-
tation of ambiguous legal texts, even when a court would construe those materials differently
as a matter of first impression”).
10. See Manning, supra note 7, at 638-39, 654, 696 (discussing the “separation of law-
making from law-exposition,” and arguing that the Seminole Rock standard fails the separation
of powers analysis).
11. See id. at 638-39, 654, 696.
12. See id. at 655 (“The right of self-interpretation under Seminole Rock removes an
important affirmative reason for the agency to express itself clearly; since the agency can say
what its own regulations mean (unless the agency’s view is plainly erroneous), the agency
bears little, if any, risk of its own opacity or imprecision.”).
13. Id. at 617.
14. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule.”). This concern is also
reflected in related criticism that the Seminole Rock deference doctrine conflicts with the APA
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Scholars have also identified related practical concerns. According to
many, the Seminole Rock standard can encourage an agency “to promulgate
excessively vague legislative rules” and “leave the more difficult task of spec-
ification to the more flexible and unaccountable process of later ‘interpret-
ing’ these open-ended regulations.”15 In other words, an agency might
intentionally leave key regulatory definitions ambiguous, knowing that it
will be given deference when it subsequently interprets its regulation during
an adjudication or during judicial review.16
These concerns have not gone unnoticed by the members of the
Court.17 For instance, Justice Antonin Scalia pushed for re-evaluation of the
doctrine from 2011 until his death in 2016.18 In 2011, in Talk America, Inc. v.
Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,19 he conceded that he “in the past [had] uncriti-
cally accepted that [deference] rule,” but now had “become increasingly
because controlling deference is incompatible with the APA direction that courts determine
“the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” Robert A. Anthony, The
Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM . U. 1, 9-10
(1996) (arguing § 706 of the APA requires a court to determine the meaning of the terms of
an agency action thereby “arm[ing] affected persons with recourse to an independent judicial
interpreter of the agency’s legislative act, where, after all, the agency is often an adverse
party”).
15. Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency
Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 290 (2000); see also Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The
Court’s Deferences—A Foolish Inconsistency, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 10, 10-11 (2000) (sug-
gesting that if an agency knows that a court will defer to its regulatory interpretation, it
creates “a powerful incentive for agencies to issue vague regulations, with the thought of
creating the operative regulatory substance later through informal interpretations”).
16. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (“It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague regulations,
because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law
through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”); see
also Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1309 (2007) (stating “the [Seminole Rock] doctrine may tempt
agencies to issue vague regulations through the relatively burdensome notice-and-comment
process”).
17. With that said, various members of the Court sporadically have voiced their con-
cern with the doctrine. See, e.g., Mullins Coal Co. of Va. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 484 U.S.
135, 170 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Seminole Rock deference must not be “a license for
an agency effectively to rewrite a regulation through interpretation.”) (citing Bowles v. Sem-
inole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)); Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 525
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating “agency rules should be clear and definite so that affected
parties will have adequate notice concerning the agency’s understanding of the law”). See
generally, Leske, Between, supra note 6 (reviewing the development of the doctrine).
18. See generally Leske, A Rock Unturned, supra note 5, at 1.
19. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50 (2011).
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doubtful of its validity.”20 In no uncertain terms, he stated that he would
welcome an opportunity to reconsider the doctrine.21
One year later, in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center,22 he
was clear that upon re-evaluation he would dispense with the doctrine,
echoing Professor Manning’s concerns that the doctrine had “no principled
basis [and] contravenes one of the great rules of separation of powers, [that
he] who writes a law must not adjudge its violation.”23 Writing separately,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, who were likely swayed by Justice
Scalia, opined that it “may be appropriate to reconsider that principle in an
appropriate case” where “the issue is properly raised and argued.”24
In 2015, the Seminole Rock doctrine appeared—although not directly—in
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n.25 In Perez, the Court reviewed a doctrine
created by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit involving the notice-and-comment procedures under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA).26 The D.C. Circuit in Paralyzed Veterans of
America v. D.C. Arena L.P. had determined that “[o]nce an agency gives its
regulation an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it
would formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice
and comment rulemaking.”27
Although the Perez Court unanimously struck down the Paralyzed Veter-
ans doctrine in a narrow opinion,28 the more noteworthy opinions were the
three concurring opinions by Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas that were
dedicated to agency deference issues, especially Seminole Rock.29 In each
opinion, the Justices shared the view that the D.C. Circuit’s creation of the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine could have been, in Justice Scalia’s words, a “cou-
rageous (indeed, brazen) attempt” to cure issues that result in part from the
application of the Seminole Rock doctrine.30 Likewise, they identified, in
20. Id. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
21. Id.
22. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597 (2013).
23. Id. at 621, 617 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “I
believe that it is time to [reconsider Auer deference].”).
24. Id. at 615-16 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
25. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
26. Id. at 1203.
27. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
The court revisited (and re-affirmed) this holding later in Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA,
177 F.3d 1030, 1034-36 (D.C. Cir. 1999), but the doctrine is most often cited as the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine.
28. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1202.
29. Id. at 1210-11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), 1211-13
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), 1213-25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
30. Id. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 1210 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (The D.C. Circuit’s creation of the
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Justice Alito’s words, the necessity that the “aggrandizement of the power of
administrative agencies” be controlled.31 And each Justice believed that re-
considering or overruling the doctrine was a means to rectify the
situation.32
But with the death of Justice Scalia and the ascension of Justice Gor-
such to the Court, Seminole Rock’s future is again uncertain. Given Justice
Gorsuch’s willingness to jettison the Chevron doctrine, what about Chevron’s
doctrinal cousin, the Seminole Rock doctrine? Will he take up Justice Scalia’s
crusade in a broader attempt to reform the Court’s deference regimes?
On one hand, given the relatedness, he might similarly question Semi-
nole Rock’s validity. His legal philosophy, including his adherence to judicial
nondelegation, would suggest that he would be skeptical of the Seminole
Rock doctrine. After all, Seminole Rock, like Chevron, is a controlling defer-
ence standard that in some scholars’ views violates the separation of powers
clause and grants an agency the power of law exposition, which is commit-
ted to the judicial branch. And the legal community has likened Justice
Gorsuch to Justice Scalia with respect to judicial philosophy.33
On the other hand, Justice Gorsuch raised no objection to Seminole Rock
while on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.34 While on the
Tenth Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch either endorsed or declined to object to
the deployment of Seminole Rock.35 What might account for this? Might he
be convinced by his new colleagues on the Court, such as Justices Thomas,
Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts, who have recently questioned the doc-
trine? To attempt to ascertain Justice Gorsuch’s view, this essay delves into
these issues.
Part I briefly introduces the Seminole Rock doctrine and explores the
Court’s recent interest in the doctrine. Part II analyzes Justice Gorsuch’s
doctrine could have been due in response to the “aggrandizement of the power of administra-
tive agencies” which stems in part from the Seminole Rock doctrine.).
31. Id.
32. See e.g., id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(noting that there are “substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock doctrine may be incorrect”);
id. at 1225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the he would abandon
Seminole Rock in the appropriate case); id. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(suggesting that the Court overrule Seminole Rock).
33. Megan McDermott, A Few Predictions for Justice Gorsuch’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 8
CALIF. L. REV. 40, 41 (2017) (“It’s no secret that Judge Gorsuch admires Justice Scalia and has
adopted several aspects of his judicial philosophy into his own jurisprudence.”); see also Adam
Liptak, In Judge Neil Gorsuch, an Echo of Scalia in Philosophy and Style, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-nomi
nee.html.
34. See Miami Tribe of Okla. v. United States, 656 F.3d 1129, 1142 (10th Cir. 2011); see
also Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., 546 F. App’x. 736, 737 (10th Cir. 2013).
35. Miami Tribe, 656 F.3d 1129.
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likely views on Seminole Rock by analyzing the key cases that Justice Gor-
such heard while on the Tenth Circuit that may have influenced his view on
the doctrine.
This analysis shows that Justice Gorsuch has expressed views on “both
sides of the Rock.” On one hand, he has endorsed and applied the Seminole
Rock standard in several cases. He has done so without examining the doc-
trine or, as Justice Scalia did, criticizing the standard. On the other hand,
Justice Gorsuch has in other cases attempted to protect parties from per-
ceived unfairness, as through lack of notice, equal protection, or due pro-
cess, which are the same outcomes that critics have alleged can result from
the application of Seminole Rock deference. And most recently, he has raised
concerns with the Court’s related agency deference regime under Chevron.
The essay concludes that although Justice Gorsuch will likely show a
newfound skepticism for the doctrine, he would likely vote to “keep the
Rock.” As explained in more detail below, Justice Gorsuch—like Justice
Scalia had for most of his tenure on the Court—has “uncritically accepted”
the Seminole Rock doctrine. Based on Justice Gorsuch’s recent opinions,
however, it appears likely that he would now be receptive to evaluating the
doctrine. But his past opinions also suggest that even if he is given the
opportunity to assess the doctrine, he will not go as far as Justice Scalia and
advocate abandonment of Seminole Rock.36
I. THE SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE DOCTRINE
A. Introduction
Review of the Seminole Rock deference doctrine’s continuing viability
requires understanding its origin and recent treatment before the Supreme
Court. This part begins by summarizing the facts and the Court’s ruling in
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.37 Next, it briefly explains the Seminole
Rock standard’s legal foundation, which was not identified by the Court un-
til nearly fifty years later. Last, it introduces the Court’s recent interest in
the doctrine to help place the importance of Justice Gorsuch’s view of the
doctrine in context.
B. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.
The Seminole Rock standard had its genesis in a Supreme Court case
decided in 1945 during World War II.38 The Court held that when courts
36. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67-69 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
37. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
38. Id.
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review an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, a court must defer
to the agency’s interpretation unless it “is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.”39
The regulation in question in Seminole Rock was promulgated under the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 to control prices of various commodi-
ties and curb wartime inflation.40 The Court analyzed “Maximum Price
Regulation No. 188,” which required that “each seller shall charge no more
than the prices which he charged during the selected base period of March 1
to 31, 1942.”41
At issue in the case was whether Seminole Rock & Sand had made a
contract to sell crushed stone for more than the price established during the
base period, as this would contravene the regulation.42 The Administrator
of the Office of Price Administration, Chester Bowles, filed a suit to pro-
hibit Seminole Rock & Sand from executing the contract in March 1942
because there had been an actual delivery for a lower price.43 Seminole
Rock & Sand did not contest that it had sold crushed stone for a lower
price, but maintained that the ceiling price was only set where there was
both a charge and a delivery at such price.44 According to Seminole Rock &
Sand, its delivery contract had been fulfilled in October 1941, and therefore
no ceiling limit had been set or exceeded.45
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit determined that Seminole
Rock & Sand was not in violation of the Maximum Price Regulation.46 On
appeal, the Court needed to assess whether Seminole Rock & Sand had
indeed charged a price that was greater than the maximum established dur-
ing the base period set forth in regulation.47 In undertaking the regulatory
construction analysis, the Court noted that the Administrator’s interpreta-
tion of the maximum price regulation would come into play only if the
regulation was ambiguous.48 If there was ambiguity, the Court held that it
“must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regula-
tion.”49 Most importantly, the Court found that “the ultimate criterion” in
the analysis is the administrative interpretation, “which becomes of control-
39. Id. at 414.
40. Id. at 413.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 412, 415.
43. Id. at 412.
44. Id. at 415.
45. See id. at 412, 415.
46. Id. at 412-13.
47. Id. at 413.
48. Id. at 413-14.
49. Id. at 414.
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ling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”50
With respect to the language in the regulation, the Court determined
that the phrase “highest price charged during March, 1942” was ambigu-
ous.51 It thus turned to the administrative construction of the regulation, set
forth in a bulletin issued at the time the Maximum Price Regulation was
issued.52 In the bulletin, the Administrator had stated that the price ceiling
was set by looking to the highest price of an actual delivery during March
1942.53 The Court deferred to the Administrator’s interpretation, reversed
the decision of the Fifth Circuit, and created what we now refer to as the
Seminole Rock deference doctrine.54 With that said, it is not entirely clear
that the Court knew that its statement that deference was required unless
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” would become the
definitive standard governing agency regulatory deference.55
In establishing the Seminole Rock standard that courts must give an
agency’s interpretation “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation,” the Court did not explain its rationale or
its legal basis for such a standard.56 Close to five decades later, however, the
Court supplied the basis for the standard. In the 1991 case Martin v. Occupa-
tional Safety & Health Review Commission,57 the Court explained that the
Seminole Rock deference standard was justified as a part of the agency’s dele-
gated lawmaking powers. Then, in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,58 de-
cided the same year, the Court elaborated that an agency’s power to
authoritatively interpret its own regulations under Seminole Rock was rooted
in Congress’s delegation of power to an agency.59
50. Id.
51. Id. at 415.
52. Id. at 417.
53. Id. at 415, 417-18. The Court also appears to have been likely swayed that the
Administrator had placed the public on notice of this interpretation and it had been consis-
tent. See id. at 417-18.
54. See id. at 418.
55. Id. at 414.
56. Id.; see generally Leske, Between, supra note 6 (tracing development of the doctrine).
57. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991)
(citation omitted) (“Because applying an agency’s regulation to complex or changing circum-
stances calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume
that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency’s
delegated lawmaking powers.”). For additional background on Martin and Pauley, see generally
Leske, Between, supra note 6, at 227-30.
58. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680 (1991).
59. Id. at 698 (“As delegated by Congress, then, the Secretary’s authority to promulgate
interim regulations ‘not . . . more restrictive than’ the HEW [Health, Education, and Wel-
fare] interim regulations necessarily entails the authority to interpret HEW’s regulations and
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The Court’s holdings in Pauley and Martin gave rise to additional ques-
tions. For example, given that the Court has identified congressional dele-
gation to an agency as a founding principle of the Chevron doctrine, would
any subsequent assault on Chevron have a ripple effect on the Seminole Rock
doctrine? Given that Justice Gorsuch and other members of the Court have
recently expressed skepticism of Chevron and deference to agencies, explor-
ing this question is even more important.
C. The Court’s Recent Interest in the Seminole Rock Doctrine
In the seven decades since the Seminole Rock decision, the doctrine has
“gone largely unexamined.”60 During this time, the Supreme Court and
lower courts adopted factors to determine whether Seminole Rock deference
was appropriate.61 There have been instances, however, where members of
the Court have expressed concern about granting an agency controlling def-
erence for its interpretation of its regulation.
For example, in a 1987 case, Justice Thurgood Marshall cautioned that
Seminole Rock deference must not be “a license for an agency effectively to
rewrite a regulation through interpretation.”62 In 1994, Justice Clarence
Thomas (joined by three colleagues) echoed the concern that Seminole Rock
deference provided an incentive for agencies to promulgate vague regula-
tions (since the agency can receive controlling deference later when it “clari-
fies” the interpretation). In his view, “agency rules should be clear and
definite so that affected parties will have adequate notice concerning the
agency’s understanding of the law.”63 These observations, however, were
raised to voice concern over specific instances where the application of the
doctrine was perceived to have resulted in unfairness to a party.
the discretion to promulgate interim regulations based on a reasonable interpretation
thereof. From this congressional delegation derives the Secretary’s entitlement to judicial
deference.”). For further background on Pauley, see generally Leske, Between, supra note 6.
60. Leske, Between, supra note 6, at 229 (asserting that unlike Chevron, the Seminole
Rock deference doctrine has “gone largely unexamined”).
61. See Leske, Between, supra note 6, at 248 (noting that the most prominent of the
Supreme Court factors include “whether the agency’s interpretation has been consistent over
time, whether the agency stated a contrary intent when it originally promulgated the regula-
tion, and the format in which the agency has expressed its interpretation”). For a detailed
analysis of the interpretation offered by the United States Courts of Appeals, see Kevin O.
Leske, Splits in the Rock, supra note 9.
62. Mullins Coal Co. of Va. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 484 U.S. 135, 170 (1987) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). See generally Leske, Between, supra note 6 (reviewing development of the
doctrine).
63. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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It has only been very recently that justices have raised the possibility
that the Seminole Rock standard should be reconsidered altogether. The mo-
mentum toward re-evaluating the doctrine is largely attributed to former
Justice Scalia. In his 2011 concurring opinion in Talk America,64 he began
what would become an impassioned crusade to overturn the doctrine.65 The
Court in Talk America determined whether local telephone service providers
were required to allow competitors the use of their transmission facilities at
cost-based regulated rates.66 Because it determined that the applicable Tele-
communications Act provision and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion’s (FCC) regulations were ambiguous, the Court considered the FCC’s
interpretation of its regulations.67 The Court found that under Seminole
Rock, the FCC’s interpretation was controlling.68
Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court’s reliance on Seminole Rock. He
wrote separately to inform his colleagues that he was no longer convinced
that the Seminole Rock doctrine was sound: “For while I have in the past
uncritically accepted that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful of its
validity.”69 He concluded his short concurrence by warning that “[w]e have
not been asked to reconsider Auer in the present cases [but when] we are, I
will be receptive to doing so.”70
The following year, in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,71 the
Court again heard a case that raised the doctrine. This time, however, it
refused to defer to an agency interpretation under Seminole Rock.72 The
Court in SmithKline Beecham assessed whether a Department of Labor
64. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
65. See Leske, A Rock Unturned, supra note 5 at 23.
66. Talk Am., 564 U.S. at 53.
67. Id. at 57-59. The FCC’s interpretation was that facilities must be made available if
they were to be used “to link the incumbent provider’s telephone network with the competi-
tor’s network for the mutual exchange of traffic.” Id. at 53.
68. Id. at 67 (“The FCC as amicus curiae has advanced a reasonable interpretation of its
regulations, and we defer to its views.”). The Court’s ability to rely on the amicus brief was
established in Auer v. Robbins but “first appeared in [the Court’s] jurisprudence . . . [in
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.]” Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia referred to the Seminole Rock doc-
trine as “Auer deference” and criticized the doctrine as encouraging agencies to enact vague
regulations, potentially violating the separation of powers doctrine, and “frustrate[ing] the
notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary government.” Id. at
69.
70. Id. (referring to the Seminole Rock standard, which had more recently been called
Auer deference); see Leske, A Rock Unturned, supra note 5.
71. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
72. Id. at 2166-67.
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(DOL) regulation defining “outside salesman” included pharmaceutical sales
representatives.73
First, the Court acknowledged that deference under Seminole Rock “does
not apply in all cases.”74 The Court reviewed circumstances where Seminole
Rock deference was not appropriate, such as “when there is reason to suspect
that the agency’s interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and con-
sidered judgment on the matter in question.’”75 The Court concluded that
the DOL’s interpretation was not worthy of Seminole Rock deference, espe-
cially because acceptance of the DOL’s interpretation would deprive the
public of fair warning and constitute “unfair surprise.”76 Thus, although the
Court did not find the Seminole Rock doctrine problematic as a whole, it did
recognize that it should not always be applied.77
During the Court’s 2012-13 term, the Seminole Rock doctrine took
center stage in two of the opinions written in Decker.78 The Seminole Rock
issue involved the interpretation of a regulation promulgated under the fed-
eral Clean Water Act defining discharges into navigable waters.79 The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) interpreted its regulation to ex-
clude the storm water runoff channeled from logging roads.80 The Court
deferred under Seminole Rock, finding it to be a “reasonable interpretation of
its own regulation.”81 It added that it found the “EPA’s interpretation . . . a
permissible one,” because “there is no indication that the [EPA’s] current
73. Id. at 2161.
74. Id. at 2166.
75. Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). As examples, the Court
identified that an agency’s interpretation might not reflect its fair and considered judgment.
The first example is “when the agency’s interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation.”
Id. (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)). Second, the Court
identified that an agency’s interpretation might not reflect its fair and considered judgment
when an agency’s interpretation appears to be “nothing more than a ‘convenient litigating
position.’” Id. at 2166-67 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213
(1988)). Third, an agency’s interpretation might not reflect its fair and considered judgment
when the interpretation is a ‘“post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to
defend past agency action against attack.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quot-
ing Auer, 519 U.S. at 462).
76. Id. at 2167, 2167-68 (citation omitted).
77. See id. at 2167.
78. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 601-03 (2013).
79. Id. at 601. Under the CWA, a permit is required if the discharge is “deemed to be
‘associated with industrial activity.’ ” By regulation, EPA defines “the term ‘associated with
industrial activity’ to cover only discharges ‘from any conveyance that is used for collecting
and conveying storm water and that is directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw
materials storage areas at an industrial plant.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).
80. Id. The United States appeared as amicus curiae on behalf of the EPA. Id.
81. Id.
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view [was] a change from prior practice or a post hoc justification adopted in
response to litigation.”82
Justice Scalia again penned a separate opinion to convey his frustration
with the Seminole Rock doctrine.83 He lamented that “[e]nough is enough”
with respect to “giving agencies the authority to say what their rules
mean . . . under the harmless-sounding banner of” Seminole Rock.84 He de-
cried that the doctrine had “no principled basis” and “contravenes one of the
great rules of separation of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge
its violation.”85
To be sure, Justice Scalia’s opinion is significant by itself with respect to
casting light on the problems arguably inherent in the Seminole Rock doc-
trine, but the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, which was joined
by Justice Alito, thrust Seminole Rock doctrine into the spotlight. In his
opinion, the Chief Justice expressly made the legal bar “aware that there is
some interest in reconsidering” Seminole Rock and its progeny.86 In addition,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito tacitly suggested that they agreed
that Justice Scalia’s opinion had posed “serious questions about the principle
set forth” in these cases.87
Taken together, the justices’ opinions in Talk America, SmithKline
Beecham, and Decker suggested that momentum among the justices was
building toward the Court taking a Seminole Rock case. But after the Court’s
various opinions in Perez, the review seemed a virtual certainty.88 Interest-
ingly, Perez was not ostensibly a Seminole Rock doctrine case. But the three
separate concurring opinions of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito showed
that Seminole Rock was on most of the justices’ minds.89
Before the Court in Perez was the validity of the Paralyzed Veterans doc-
trine as applied to Section 551 of the APA.90 Created by the U.S. Court of
82. Id. at 613-14 (citing SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2166–67).
83. Id. at 616 (citing Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 621.
86. Id. at 616 (Robert, C.J., concurring) (making the legal bar “aware that there is some
interest in reconsidering” Seminole Rock and Auer).
87. Id. at 615-16 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)) (noting that
although “[i]t may be appropriate to reconsider that principle in an appropriate case,” he
“would await a case in which the issue is properly raised and argued”).
88. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
89. Id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
1211-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
90. Id. at 1203; see also 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1997, the Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine directed that “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation an interpreta-
tion, it can only change that interpretation as it would formally modify the
regulation itself: through the process of notice and comment rulemaking.”91
Because an agency’s informal interpretations of its own regulations were
purportedly also subject to the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, the Seminole Rock
doctrine seemed to be implicated in the Court’s review.92
At issue in Perez were regulations promulgated by the DOL implement-
ing the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).93 The FLSA generally requires
that employers subject to the Act pay overtime wages to employees who
work more than forty hours per week, but provides limited exemptions.94
The Mortgage Bankers Association alleged, and the D.C. Circuit agreed,
that the DOL had changed its interpretation of the scope of the exemption
but had not gone through notice and comment rulemaking, thereby violat-
ing the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.95
Justice Sotomayor wrote the decision on behalf of a unanimous court,
holding that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine “improperly impose[d] on agen-
cies an obligation beyond the ‘maximum procedural requirements’ specified
in the APA.”96 The APA’s categorical exemption of interpretive rules from
the notice and comment provisions showed the Court that the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine could not stand.97
91. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Although the doctrine is most often cited as the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, the court revis-
ited, and re-affirmed, this holding later in Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030,
1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
92. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204–05.
93. See id.; see generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012).
94. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204-05; see Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-62; see also Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195-96 (D.D.C.
2012); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  The court reviewed a FLSA exemption that provides “any
employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity[,] . . . or
in the capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to
time by regulations of the Secretary[,] . . .),” is exempt from the “[m]inimum wage and
maximum hour requirements” otherwise required by the Act. See Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at
196 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)).
95. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 196-201. The change in interpretation involved whether
certain employees, such as mortgage loan officers, should be subject to the FLSA exemption,
thereby precluding them from over-time pay.
96. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203, 1206 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)). The Court reasoned that the APA plain lan-
guage stated that unless “notice or hearing is required by statute,” the notice-and-comment
requirement “does not apply . . . to interpretative rules.” Id. at 1206 (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(A)).
97. Id.
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As indicated above, the case was notable for the separate opinions of
Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia devoted to the Seminole Rock doctrine.
For example, in Justice Alito’s short opinion that concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment, he agreed that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine
was “incompatible” with the APA.98 He next lamented that the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s creation of the doctrine could have been a response to the “aggran-
dizement of the power of administrative agencies.”99 And he identified the
Seminole Rock deference doctrine as a contributor to such power and sug-
gested that the Court could check this power by reigning in the Seminole
Rock doctrine.100 He concluded by pointing to the separate opinions of both
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas to support the “substantial reasons why
the Seminole Rock doctrine may be incorrect.”101
Justice Thomas’s lengthy opinion detailed his view that Seminole Rock
deference “effects a transfer of the judicial power to an executive agency,”
which created serious constitutional concerns.102 In particular, he compre-
hensively laid out his view that Seminole Rock eviscerates the courts’ consti-
tutional mandate to be a check on the other branches and thereby “subjects
regulated parties to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to pre-
vent.”103 Although he conceded the importance of stare decisis, his alle-
giance to the principle that he should  “decide by our best lights what the
Constitution means” led him to conclude that he would abandon the Semi-
nole Rock doctrine in an appropriate case.104
For his part, Justice Scalia’s concurrence represents his most thorough
argument on why Seminole Rock should be overruled. In his view, the
Court’s current deference doctrines, such as the Seminole Rock doctrine, up-
set the balance that Congress envisioned in passing the APA.105 He believed
98. Id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment (declining
to join Part III-B)).
99. Id.
100. Id. (noting that such power also resulted from Congress’s delegation of broad law-
making authority to agencies and the potential for agencies to take advantage of the diffi-
culty for courts to discern between legislative and interpretive rules).
101. Id. at 1210-11 (“I await a case in which the validity of Seminole Rock may be explored
through full briefing and argument.”).
102. Id. at 1213, 1225.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1225 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 812 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
105. Id.  at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the “elaborate law of deference to
agencies’ interpretation of statutes and regulations” now gives agencies the ability to “author-
itatively resolve ambiguities” in both statues and regulations).
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that deference to agency interpretations allowed agencies to bind the public,
because such interpretive rules effectively have the force of law.106
Justice Scalia identified Seminole Rock deference doctrine as being par-
ticularly problematic because it can incentivize an agency to  promulgate a
broad and vague substantive regulation which the agency can subsequently
“interpret” according to its needs and then receive controlling deference.107
Not only would this ability, Justice Scalia maintained, run counter to Con-
gress’s intent when it enacted the APA, but it would raise separation of
powers concerns that he had expressed in earlier cases.108
To “restore the balance originally struck by the APA with respect to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations,” Justice Scalia proposed that
the Court overrule Seminole Rock.109 This push for the reversal of the Semi-
nole Rock deference doctrine would be Justice Scalia’s final words with re-
spect to the doctrine. After his death, those in the legal community
following the Court’s recent interest in Seminole Rock wondered whether
this would be the end of Justice Scalia’s crusade.
II. BOTH SIDES OF THE ROCK
A. Introduction
Shortly after Justice Scalia’s death, the Court was presented with an
attractive opportunity to reconsider the Seminole Rock doctrine.  In Bible v.
United Student Aid Funds, Inc.,110 the application of the Seminole Rock doc-
trine was the outcome-determinative issue.111 But over a stinging dissent by
Justice Thomas, the Court denied certiorari in May 2016.112 More telling,
there was a resounding silence from the justices who had in the past ap-
peared sympathetic to Justices Scalia and Thomas’s pleas to reconsider the
106. See id. at 1212 (“Interpretive rules that command deference do have the force of
law.”) (emphasis in original).
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1212-13.
109. Id. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas wrote at length about his disdain for the
Seminole Rock doctrine. Id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). For an
in-depth look at Justice Thomas’s views, see Kevin O. Leske, Chipping Away at the Rock;
Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association and the Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine, 49 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 375 (2016).
110. Bible v. U.S. Aid Funds, Inc., 807 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
1607 (2016).
111. Bible, 807 F.3d at 841 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc) (stating “this is one of those situations in which the precise nature of deference (if any)
to an agency’s views may well control the outcome”).
112. Bible, 136 S. Ct. at 1608 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
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doctrine.113 Thus, it appeared that the fight against the Seminole Rock doc-
trine that Justice Scalia began in 2011 was at its end.114
But with the ascension of Justice Gorsuch to the Court, Seminole Rock’s
future is once again questionable. Given the profound practical importance
of the doctrine in our administrative state and the Court’s recent interest in
the doctrine, an assessment of Justice Gorsuch’s view is far from academic.
Accordingly, with the genesis of Seminole Rock deference and an expla-
nation of the Court’s recent interest in the doctrine in mind, this part ex-
plores the pivotal issue of how Justice Gorsuch might vote if the Court
reconsiders the Seminole Rock doctrine. The part assesses Justice Gorsuch’s
likely views on the Seminole Rock doctrine by analyzing key cases that Justice
Gorsuch heard while on the Tenth Circuit.
B. Keep the Rock?
In several cases while on the Tenth Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch ap-
plied the Seminole Rock doctrine in a rote fashion. Although, naturally, he
was bound to follow the doctrine under Tenth Circuit precedent, at no time
did he write separately to voice his concern over the doctrine, as he did with
respect to the Chevron doctrine. Nor did he write separately as Justice Scalia
had done repeatedly with respect to the Seminole Rock doctrine.
In 2011, Justice Gorsuch was a member of the panel in Miami Tribe of
Oklahoma v. United States, where the court relied on the Seminole Rock doc-
trine.115 The appeal raised the issue of whether “the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs (BIA) properly exercised its discretion to reject a gift of property by a
member of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma to the tribe.”116
Although the case involved jurisdictional issues and had a “complicated
history,” the crux of the dispute involved the proposed transfer by Miami
Tribe member James Smith of a portion of his property interest in a parcel
located in Miami County, Kansas, which required BIA approval.117 More
specifically, Smith “owned a 3/38 undivided restricted interest in the Re-
113. Neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito joined Justice Thomas’s dissent
from the denial of certiorari in Bible, 136 S. Ct. at 1608 (Thomas, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari).
114. See Leske, A Rock Unturned, supra note 5.
115. Miami Tribe of Okla. v. United States, 656 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2011).
116. Id. at 1131.
117. Id. at 1131-32. The parcel at issue was the Maria Christiana Reserve No. 35, which
was a 35–acre parcel of land located “approximately 180 miles from Miami Tribe’s current
land-base in Ottawa County, Oklahoma.” Id. at 1132.
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serve and applied [to BIA] to give 1/3 of his interest (i.e. 1/38 interest) to
Miami Tribe.”118
The BIA had denied the application, “[c]iting concerns regarding frac-
tionation of the land interests in the Reserve as well as the long-range best
interests of Reserve landowners.”119 It found that “(1) the gift transfer was
not in Smith’s or other Reserve landowners’ long-range best interests, and
(2) the transfer would conflict with the government’s policy regarding frac-
tionated interests in Indian land.”120 After the district court reversed the
BIA’s decision, the Tenth Circuit panel disagreed and found that “the BIA
properly applied the applicable statutes and regulations when it denied
Smith’s application.”121
In reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit held that “[w]hen consider-
ing agency action made pursuant to its own regulations, we do not ‘decide
which among several competing interpretations best serves the regulatory
purpose,’ but rather ‘give substantial deference to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of its own regulations.’ ”122 Citing the Seminole Rock standard, it held
that the “agency’s interpretation will control ‘unless “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.”’”123
The Tenth Circuit next turned to the applicable regulations promul-
gated by the BIA, which cover “the sale, exchange, and conveyance of Indian
trust or restricted lands.”124 After applying the deference doctrines, the
court ruled that “the BIA properly interpreted and applied its own regula-
tions, . . . which afford discretion to approve a land transfer.”125 It found
that gifts are not required to be accepted by the regulation and that a land
conveyance “may be approved” if after a “careful examination” the BIA con-
cludes the gift  transfer is “clearly justified” in the “long-range best interest
of the landowners.”126
Although it conceded that “[t]here are no explicit factors the BIA must
consider when making its determination,” the BIA had supplied detailed
118. Id. at 1141. The court noted that Smith wanted to give the land because of his
“desire to do something for the benefit of the Miami Tribe and its members.” Id. at 1141-42.
119. Id. at 1131.
120. Id. at 1142.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Morris v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 598 F.3d 677, 684 (10th
Cir. 2010)).
123. Id. (quoting Plateau Mining Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
519 F.3d 1176, 1192 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997))).
124. Id. at 1143, 1147 (citing 25 C.F.R. §§ 152.23, 152.25(d)).
125. Id. at 1147.
126. Id. 1146-47 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 152.25(d) (“Indian owners may convey . . . restricted
land . . . when some other special relationship exists. . . .”)).
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reasoning for its denial of Smith’s application.127 And in light of the plausi-
ble reasoning, the panel found that it “cannot substitute [its] judgment for
the BIA’s considered judgment.”128 Although the tribe preferred a different
interpretation of the BIA regulations at issue, the court rejected it by apply-
ing the Seminole Rock standard and finding that the BIA interpretation was
“neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation because it is
a reasonable framework to guide the BIA’s otherwise unfettered discre-
tion.”129 The court, therefore, deferred “to the BIA’s interpretation of its
own regulation,” again citing a Tenth Circuit case setting forth the Seminole
Rock standard.130
Thus, in joining the decision, then-Judge Gorsuch endorsed the doc-
trine. He raised no concern with its application even though Justice Scalia
had already started his criticism of the doctrine in his concurring opinion in
Talk America several months earlier.131
Two years later, Justice Gorsuch sat on the panel in Garrett v. Recon-
Trust Co.,132 where appellant Gary Garrett had appealed the dismissal of
claims related to the foreclosure sale of his residence in Utah by Recon-
Trust, Co. (ReconTrust).133 Garrett maintained that Utah state law forbade
ReconTrust, which had no offices in Utah, from instituting a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale because certain designated state entities were permitted to
do so pursuant to the statute.134 ReconTrust contended—and the district
court agreed—that the permissibility of the sale of the residence was gov-
erned by a federal banking statute, which stated that the state law of where
ReconTrust was “located” would be applied.135 Therefore, under Texas law,
which was where ReconTrust asserted it was “located” for the purpose of the
federal  statute, the nonjudicial sale was legal.136
127. Id. at 1147.
128. Id.
129. Id. The tribe asserted that BIA was required “to approve a gift when a special
relationship exists under § 152.25(d) without performing a long-range best interests analy-
sis.” Id. (emphasis omitted). On the other hand, the BIA interpreted the regulations to mean
that “the BIA must review a gift for the long-range best interests, even when the gift falls
within § 152.25(d).” Id. (emphasis omitted).
130. Id. (citing Plateau Mining Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
519 F.3d 1176, 1192 (10th Cir. 2008)).
131. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67-68 (2011). The Court
decided Talk America on June 9, 2011, and the Tenth Circuit issued its opinion for Miami
Tribe on August 30, 2011. Id.; Miami Tribe, 656 F.3d 1129.
132. Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., 546 F. App’x. 736 (10th Cir. 2013).
133. Id. at 737.
134. Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57–1–21, 57–1–23).
135. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a)-(b)).
136. Id. (citing TEX. FIN. CODE §§ 32.001, 182.001).
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After noting “that the law in this area is unsettled,” and that there were
“compelling arguments to be found on both sides,” the court first reviewed
Garrett’s plain language argument that under the federal statute, “Utah law,
not Texas law, governed the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of Garrett’s resi-
dence.”137 The court found that the statute “provide[d] no direction” in situ-
ations where “activities related to the foreclosure sale occur in more than
one state[ ].”138 Therefore, it found that the statute was ambiguous as to the
“state” in which Recon[Trust] was “located” under the circumstances
presented.139
Next, the court analyzed “the interpretive regulations promulgated by
the [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)] for guidance.”140
The panel recognized that the OCC’s Rule 9.7, which interprets the federal
statute at issue, “arguably lends itself to more than one interpretation.”141
But it determined that it “need not dwell on the parties’ speculation” con-
cerning OCC’s interpretation of the regulation as it applied to the facts in
the case because “OCC had expressly articulated its position on the subject
in another case recently decided by [the Tenth Circuit.]”142 The court con-
cluded that the OCC’s views “resolve the parties’ disputes over the OCC’s
interpretation” of the federal statute.143
Then, citing the Seminole Rock standard set forth in the 2013 Supreme
Court case of Decker, the panel held that “OCC’s interpretations of its own
regulations are authoritative unless they are ‘plainly erroneous or inconsis-
tent with the regulation.’”144 It also noted, citing Auer, that the fact that
“the OCC’s interpretation of its own regulations ‘comes to us in the form
of a legal brief’ does not detract from the deference owed where, as here, the
OCC’s position is not a ‘post hoc rationalization advanced . . . to defend
past agency action against attack.’ ”145
Under the OCC’s view, a national bank, such as ReconTrust, “is ‘lo-
cated’ in (and hence, permitted to act as a foreclosure trustee to the same
extent as allowed by the laws of) the ‘state’ where it ‘acts in a fiduciary
capacity,’ which is determined using the ‘location where the bank: (1) ac-
137. Id. at 738.
138. Id. (citing Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 44 (1977) (that “[t]here
is no enduring rigidity about the word ‘located.’”)).
139. Id. at 739.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 740.
142. Id. (citing Brief for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as Amicus Cu-
riae, Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2013) (No. 12–4150)).
143. Id. at 741.
144. Id. at 740 (citing Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 613 (2013)).
145. Id. (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
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cepted the fiduciary appointment; (2) executed the documents that create
the fiduciary relationship; and (3) makes discretionary decisions regarding
fiduciary assets.’ ”146 Because Garrett had not disputed that “(1) Recon per-
formed the three acts enumerated in Texas, such that Recon was ‘located’
there as that term has been construed by the OCC, and (2) Texas law per-
mitted Recon to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of Garrett’s resi-
dence,” the court affirmed the district court’s decision that Texas law
applied.147
As in Miami Tribe, then-Judge Gorsuch raised no objection to Seminole
Rock and surely would have been aware of the Court’s recent interest in the
doctrine. Earlier in the year, Justice Scalia had decried that “[e]nough is
enough” with respect to “giving agencies the authority to say what their
rules mean . . . under the harmless-sounding banner of” Seminole Rock,148
and Chief Justice Roberts specifically made the legal bar “aware that there is
some interest in reconsidering” Seminole Rock and its progeny.149
The final case that is probative of Justice Gorsuch’s future view of the
validity of the Seminole Rock doctrine did not directly cite or rely on Semi-
nole Rock or its progeny. In Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, then-Judge Gorsuch partici-
pated on a panel in the 2010 case involving “decisions made by two federal
agencies that would allow UtahAmerican Energy, Inc. (UEI) to proceed in
the development of the Lila Canyon Mine” in Utah.150
The facts of the case are as follows: on September 22, 2000, UEI was
assigned six coal leases in Lila Canyon, Utah, from the previous owner.151
Before beginning mining operations for these federal coal reserves, UEI
was required to secure state approval from Utah under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act152 and from the federal government under the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, “which falls under the authority of the Assis-
146. Id. at 741 (quoting Brief for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency as
Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2013) (No. 12–4150)).
147. Id. at 742.
148. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013) (citing Talk Am., Inc. v.
Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 67 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
149. Id. (Robert, C.J., concurring).
150. S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & Enf’t, 620
F.3d 1227, 1230 (10th Cir. 2010).
151. Id.
152. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (requiring state permit); 30 C.F.R. § 944.30 (delegating
authority to Utah to issue mining permits on federal lands).
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tant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management in the Department of
the Interior.”153
After resolving a jurisdictional issue and prior to analyzing the merits,
the court noted that it was “mindful of a number of basic principles of
administrative law.”154 The panel explained that “when an agency subse-
quently interprets its own order, we owe deference to this interpretation as
well.”155 Although it did not cite Seminole Rock or Auer, it essentially quoted
the Seminole Rock standard set forth in a decision by the D.C. Circuit that
“an agency’s interpretation of its own orders should be upheld ‘unless its
interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the order.’ ”156 Simi-
lar to the rationale of Seminole Rock, the panel seemed to recognize that
deference was appropriate because “the BLM orders here exemplify the
types of decisions necessary to administer a complex regime of laws and
regulations, and a delicate balancing of potentially conflicting policy consid-
erations.”157 With no objection from then-Judge Gorsuch, the panel  found
that it “thus owe[d] deference to BLM’s interpretation of its order” and
affirmed the district court’s decision that  “BLM acted properly in deter-
mining UEI’s lease is still valid, and that OSM was in conformity with its
statutory duties when it declined to issue a new recommendation” regarding
UEI’s mining plan.158
Taken together, Miami Tribe,159 Garrett,160 and Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance161 demonstrate that Justice Gorsuch has uncritically accepted the
Seminole Rock deference doctrine in the past. Unlike Justice Scalia when he
153. S. Utah Wilderness All., 620 F.3d at 1230; 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (approval of a
mining plan).
154. S. Utah Wilderness All., 620 F.3d at 1235. The court stated that “considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer.” Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). It also noted that “[w]hile informal agency orders, like the ones at
issue in this case, fall short of actions that “make rules carrying the force of law,” (quoting
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)), “they deserve at least some
deference.” Id. at 1236.
155. Id. at 1236 (citing Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FERC, 791 F.2d 803, 810 (10th Cir.
1986) (“An agency’s interpretation of its own order is entitled to great weight.”)); see also
Consumers Energy Co. v. FERC, 428 F.3d 1065, 1067-68 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (an agency’s
interpretation of its own orders should be upheld “unless its interpretation is plainly errone-
ous or inconsistent with the order”).
156. S. Utah Wilderness All., 620 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Consumers Energy, 428 F.3d at
1067-68).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1230, 1242.
159. Miami Tribe of Okla. v. United States, 656 F.3d 1129 (2011).
160. Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., 546 F. App’x. 736 (2013).
161. S. Utah Wilderness All., 620 F.3d 1227.
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began to question the doctrine, Justice Gorsuch made no attempt to cast
doubt on the doctrine despite having had the opportunity. These appellate
court cases suggest that if asked to reconsider the doctrine in a future Su-
preme Court case, he would likely vote to “keep the Rock.”
C. Flip the Rock?
In contrast to the cases discussed above where then-Judge Gorsuch
granted Seminole Rock deference to an agency’s interpretation, there are
other indicators that he might be open to re-evaluate and then reconsider
Seminole Rock in a future case. While these “tell-tale” cases do not involve
Seminole Rock deference directly, then-Judge Gorsuch expressed views that
could signal that he might change his view towards Seminole Rock.
For example, in a 2010 environmental case, he recognized in dicta that
other doctrines such as lack of notice, equal protection, and due process
would also need to be analyzed—irrespective of whether an agency action
was otherwise in accordance with law.162 In this respect, he might join op-
ponents of Seminole Rock that have criticized the ad hoc approach to whether
to apply the doctrine. Thus, Justice Gorsuch might later decide, as Justice
Scalia did, that “[e]nough is enough” with respect to Seminole Rock.163
In United States v. Magnesium Corp. of America,164 a panel of the Tenth
Circuit that included then-Judge Gorsuch was called upon to review the
grant of summary judgment to U.S. Magnesium165 regarding the applicabil-
ity of regulations promulgated under Subtitle C of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976.166 The lower court found that because the
EPA could not change its prior interpretation of its regulation without first
complying with the notice and comment procedures of the APA, its previ-
ous interpretation exempting five of U.S. Magnesium’s wastes from Subti-
tle C was unlawful.167
The court vacated the judgment, finding that even if it were to agree
that EPA is not permitted to set forth a new interpretation without follow-
ing the APA, EPA had not adopted a definitive regulatory interpretation
that would be subject to such a prohibition.168 In reaching its conclusion,
162. See United States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1142-44 (10th Cir.
2010).
163. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
164. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d 1129.
165. U.S. Magnesium, LLC was the Defendant-Intervenor-Appellee. Id.
166. Id. at 1130.
167. Id. at 1131.
168. Id.
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the court analyzed the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine,169 which was subse-
quently struck down by the Supreme Court in Perez, discussed above.170
After rejecting U.S. Magnesium’s contention that “an agency may not
abandon a prior interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation without first
going through notice and comment,”171 then-Judge Gorsuch quipped that
“one might worry that administrative law has simply abandoned regulated
parties to the whims of an agency’s arbitrary interpretive reversals.”172 But
he then explained that “there [was] no reason for undue alarm” because “at
least two other layers of protection exist” for “the reasonable and settled
expectations of the regulated public.”173
Then-Judge Gorsuch reasoned that courts can overturn agency action
under the APA if such action is “arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of direc-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”174 This standard requires
that an agency “must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a
given manner” which applies with equal force whether an agency is replac-
ing a previous interpretation or setting forth its first interpretation of a
regulation.175
Moreover, then-Judge Gorsuch reasoned that even if the APA did not
protect parties, “the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments would still prohibit the imposition of penalties without fair
notice,” which “requires at the least that ‘laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.’”176 Ap-
plying this concept to agency regulations, he further explained that “it per-
tains when an agency advances a novel interpretation of its own regulation
169. Id. at 1138-40; see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579,
586 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The court revisited (and re-affirmed) this holding later in Alaska Prof’l
Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), but the doctrine is most often
cited as the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.
170. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). See infra pp. 116-19.
171. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d at 1138 (citing Alaska Prof’l Hunters Ass’n, 177 F.3d
1030). See generally Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (“Once an agency gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only change that
interpretation as it would formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice
and comment rulemaking.”).
172. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d at 1143.
173. Id. at 1143-44.
174. Id. at 1144 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
175. Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983)).
176. Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)); see also U.S.
CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. Justice Gorsuch noted that the “principle applies to civil as well
as criminal penalties, albeit in slightly different form.” Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d at 1144
(citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99
(1982)).
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in the course of a civil enforcement action” and that changes to regulatory
interpretations must not create “unfair surprise.”177 He concluded that “[i]f
an agency could punish a regulated party for following the agency’s own
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations, . . . ‘the practice of admin-
istrative law would come to resemble “Russian Roulette.”’”178
Justice Gorsuch’s dicta in Magnesium Corp. suggests that he might take a
more skeptical view of Seminole Rock than his other Seminole Rock cases
would suggest. Thus, it remains to be seen whether he would go so far as to
overturn Seminole Rock rather than apply an ad hoc approach incorporating
other safeguards to see whether Seminole Rock deference is warranted.
Arguably the most notable opinion penned by then-Judge Gorsuch
while on the Tenth Circuit outlined his concern for the Chevron deference
doctrine. And it has significant relevance to Justice Gorsuch’s future view of
Seminole Rock. In Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, the court reviewed “two provi-
sions buried in our immigration laws.”179 The first provision “grants the
Attorney General discretion to ‘adjust the status’ of those who have entered
the country illegally and afford them lawful residency.”180 The second pro-
vision “provides that certain persons who have entered this country illegally
more than once are categorically prohibited from winning lawful resi-
dency . . . unless they first serve a ten-year waiting period outside our
borders.”181 The interaction of these provisions during the subsequent liti-
gation and appeals of cases involving these provisions.
Prior to Lynch, in a 2005 case, the Tenth Circuit had determined that
“the Attorney General’s discretion to afford relief without insisting on a
177. Magnesium Corp, 616 F.3d at 1144 (citing Walker Stone Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 156
F.3d 1076, 1083–84 (10th Cir. 1998) (“In order to satisfy constitutional due process require-
ments, regulations must be sufficiently specific to give regulated parties adequate notice of
the conduct they require or prohibit.”) and Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551
U.S. 158, 170–71 (2007) (“[I]nterpretive changes [to regulations must] create no unfair
surprise.”)).
178. Id. (quoting Satellite Broad. Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). With
respect to these protections, Justice Gorsuch explained that U.S. Magnesium had not “raised
any argument or sought decision of any issue arising under either § 706(2)(A) of the APA or
the Due Process Clause” and that these arguments were therefore waived. Id. (citing Rollins
Envtl. Servs. (NJ) Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 652 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding waiver of
due process notice argument in agency enforcement action involving novel interpretation of
ambiguous regulation) and Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160, 1172 n.17 (10th Cir.
2007)).
179. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1144 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1255(i)(2)(A), 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)).
180. Id. (citing De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015)).
181. Id.
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decade-long waiting period remained intact.”182 Then, in 2007, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) set forth its contrary view that “as a matter of
policy discretion—the statutory tension should be resolved against affording
the Attorney General any discretion to consider applications for adjustment
of status.”183 This new viewpoint was again challenged and found permissi-
ble because “when a statute is ambiguous and an executive agency’s inter-
pretation is reasonable, the agency may indeed exercise delegated legislative
authority to overrule a judicial precedent in favor of the agency’s preferred
interpretation.”184
In yet another case involving these provisions, the court had to deter-
mine whether BIA could apply its new interpretation retroactively to pro-
hibit parties who “applied for discretionary relief in express reliance on [the
court’s 2005 case allowing discretionary relief], before the BIA’s announce-
ment of its contrary interpretation” in 2007.185 The court rejected BIA’s
attempt, holding that “because the agency’s promulgation of a new rule of
general applicability under Chevron step two and Brand X is an exercise of
delegated legislative policymaking authority, it is subject to the presump-
tion of prospectivity [sic] that attends true exercises of legislative
authority.”186
The final point at issue in Lynch involved petitioner Hugo Gutierrez-
Brizuela, who applied for adjustment of status during the window in which
BIA had announced its new interpretation but before the Tenth Circuit had
reviewed and approved of BIA’s new interpretation.187 Then-Judge Gor-
such, writing for the panel, found that “a statutory grant of legislative
rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encom-
pass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is con-
veyed by Congress in express terms.”188 The court therefore rejected the
BIA’s attempt to foist its new interpretation on the petitioner.189
182. Id. (citing Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales (Padilla-Caldera I), 426 F.3d 1294,
1299–1301 (10th Cir. 2005), amended and superseded on reh’g by 453 F.3d 1237, 1242–44
(10th Cir. 2006)).
183. Id. (quoting In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (B.I.A. 2007)).
184. Id. at 1143 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984) and Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005)).
185. Id. at 1144.
186. Id. (citing De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1172-74 (10th Cir. 2015)).
187. Id. at 1144-45.
188. Id. at 1145 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. Id. at 1149.
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Then-Judge Gorsuch then wrote a separate concurring opinion attack-
ing the judiciary’s deference regime under Chevron.190 In his view, Chevron
and its progeny “permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of
core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way
that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the
framers’ design.”191
He concentrated on the Court’s holding in National Cable & Telecommu-
nications Association v. Brand X Internet Services192 (Brand X), under which
“courts are required to overrule their own declarations about the meaning of
existing law in favor of interpretations dictated by executive agencies.”193 In
his view, the application of the Brand X rule “means a judicial declaration of
the law’s meaning in a case or controversy before it is not ‘authoritative,’
but is instead subject to revision by a politically accountable branch of
government.”194
Then-Judge Gorsuch then suggested that the underlying problem cre-
ated by Brand X was a result of Chevron itself. He noted that although under
Marbury v. Madison195 legal questions “must be tried by the judicial author-
ity” to fulfill the court’s role to interpret “statutory provisions, declaring
what the law is, and overturning inconsistent agency action,” step two of the
Chevron analysis “tells us we must allow an executive agency to resolve the
meaning of any ambiguous statutory provision.”196 And in this respect, he
viewed Chevron as “a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial
duty” because a court does not “independently decide what the statute
means.”197
His concern that Chevron deference allowed agencies to “usurp the judi-
cial function” applies with at least equal force to the Seminole Rock doc-
trine.198 His view that this transfer of the constitutional role of “saying what
the law is from the judiciary to the executive unsurprisingly invites the very
sort of due process (fair notice) and equal protection concerns the framers
knew would arise if the political branches intruded on judicial functions”
likewise implicates his view of the Seminole Rock doctrine.199 If he were to
190. Id.  (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
191. Id.
192. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-85
(2005).
193. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1150 (Gorsuch, J. concurring).
194. Id. (internal citations omitted).
195. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 167 (1803).
196. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1151-52 (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (internal quotation
omitted).
197. Id. at 1152.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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apply these judicial non-delegation principles in a Seminole Rock case, he
very well may vote against it.
Another relevant concern then-Judge Gorsuch raised in his concurring
opinion involves the ability for an agency to “reverse its current view 180
degrees anytime based merely on the shift of political winds and still pre-
vail.”200  Equally applicable to the regulatory context is the argument that
“[n]either, too, will agencies always deign to announce their views in ad-
vance; often enough they seek to impose their ‘reasonable’ new interpreta-
tions only retroactively in administrative adjudications.”201 This could lead
to the same unfair surprise and due process issues he had already cautioned
against.
He also raised a broader doctrinal concern, which was separate from any
accusation of malfeasance on the part of the agency. He wondered whether
Congress can “really delegate its legislative authority—its power to write
new rules of general applicability—to executive agencies?”202 Again, a com-
parison to Seminole Rock could be made whereby the ability to definitively
interpret its own ambiguous regulations could raise a similar legislative non-
delegation issue.203 And he would likely view this delegation as even more
problematic for regulations due to the recognition that “today many admin-
istrative agencies ‘wield[ ] vast power’ and are overseen by political appoin-
tees (but often receive little effective oversight from the chief executive to
whom they nominally report).”204
Then, with direct relevance to Seminole Rock, he wondered that “[u]nder
any conception of our separation of powers, I would have thought powerful
and centralized authorities like today’s administrative agencies would have
200. Id. 1152, 1158 (emphasis omitted) (“But because even when clearly and properly
implemented, Chevron’s very point is to permit agencies to upset the settled expectations of
the people by changing policy direction depending on the agency’s mood at the moment. So
if reliance interests count, they would seem to count against retaining Chevron.”).
201. Id. at 1152.
202. Id. at 1153. He continued: “The Supreme Court has long recognized that under the
Constitution ‘congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president’ and that this
‘principle [is] universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system
of government ordained by the constitution.’” Id. (citing Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
203. Id. at 1153-54.
204. Id. at 1155 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 499 (2010)). Justice Gorsuch also viewed it as “an arrangement, too, that seems
pretty hard to square with the Constitution of the founders’ design and, as Justice Frank-
furter once observed, ‘[t]he accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does
come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions’
imposed by the Constitution.” Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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warranted less deference from other branches, not more.”205 Whether this
amounts to a new-found skepticism toward Seminole Rock’s future as well
remains to be seen, but it certainly demonstrates that Justice Gorsuch will
not be passive in accepting the doctrine.206
Then-Judge Gorsuch concluded his opinion by asking “what would hap-
pen in a world without Chevron?”207 And he could ask the same of Seminole
Rock with the same answer.  In his view, “[t]he only difference would be
that courts would then fulfill their duty to exercise their independent judg-
ment about what the law is” and “courts could and would consult agency
views and apply the agency’s interpretation when it accords with the best
reading of a [regulation].”208 Moreover, eliminating Seminole Rock “would
avoid the due process and equal protection problems of the kind docu-
mented in our decisions [and] would promote reliance interests by allowing
citizens to organize their affairs with some assurance that the rug will not be
pulled from under them tomorrow, the next day, or after the next elec-
tion.”209 Thus, if Justice Gorsuch expands his anti-Chevron view to Seminole
Rock, the doctrine’s vitality is questionable.
CONCLUSION
There is little dispute that the Seminole Rock doctrine raises legitimate
doctrinal, pragmatic, and constitutional concerns. Given the Court’s recent
interest, it is also fair to say that the future of the Seminole Rock doctrine lies
in the balance. And Justice Gorsuch may very well hold Seminole Rock’s
future in his hands. But because Justice Gorsuch has sent mixed signals by
presenting viewpoints that support “both sides of the Rock” his view of the
doctrine, as well as the future of the doctrine, is uncertain. The question
therefore remains whether Justice Gorsuch would vote to “keep” or “flip”
the Rock.
This essay concludes that Justice Gorsuch would be very receptive to
re-evaluating the doctrine in a future case. On balance, however, upon re-
evaluation, he is more likely to vote to retain Seminole Rock, rather than
abandon it altogether as Justice Scalia had advocated before his death. Sev-
eral key points support this conclusion.
First, recent opinions by Justice Gorsuch suggest that he would be open
to re-evaluate the doctrine with an eye to overrule it. Clearly, his concurring
opinion in Gutierrez-Brizuela demonstrates a distrust of agency power and
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1158.
208. Id. (emphasis omitted).
209. Id.
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the Court’s deference regimes, which includes Seminole Rock. As previously
discussed, Justice Gorsuch’s belief that “today many administrative agencies
‘wield vast power’” that “[u]nder any conception of our separation of pow-
ers,” should warrant “less deference from other branches, not more” signals
that he would approach Seminole Rock with skepticism.210 These points are
strong indicators that he might be wary of allowing Seminole Rock to remain.
Second, in contrast, his past support of Seminole Rock tells a different
story. In all the cases where then-Judge Gorsuch was presented with a Semi-
nole Rock question, he endorsed the doctrine. To be sure, he was required to
accept the doctrine as Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent dictates,
but he did so without objection. In fact, several of those cases where he
uncritically accepted the Seminole Rock doctrine came after Justice Scalia and
other members of the Court had expressed concern over the doctrine. For
example, Justice Scalia began his crusade in 2011 in his concurring opinion
in Talk America, which pre-dated Justice Gorsuch’s key Seminole Rock
cases.211 Moreover, by 2013, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito,
had announced in Decker212 that members of the Court were interested in
reconsidering the doctrine in the appropriate case.  It seems unlikely that
these opinions escaped the notice of Justice Gorsuch. Thus, it is fair to
assume that despite Justice Scalia’s mounting criticism detailing the separa-
tion of powers and practical problem with the doctrine, then-Judge Gorsuch
either disagreed with Justice Scalia or was, at least, complacent with Semi-
nole Rock’s existence.
Third, Justice Gorsuch’s recent view that Chevron doctrine should be
eliminated should not compel his future rejection of Seminole Rock. At first
blush, Justice Gorsuch’s attack of the Chevron doctrine in Gutierrez-Brizuela
on separation of powers grounds (namely the granting of the power of both
law-exposition and lawmaking to an agency) would apply with even more
force to Seminole Rock.213 But as Professors Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule persuasively argue, “this critique of [Seminole Rock] is both un-
sound and too sweeping.”214 They reject “the traditional and mainstream
understanding” that when agencies “make rules, interpret rules, and adjudi-
cate violations, they exercise executive power, not legislative or judicial
power.”215 To the contrary, they reason that because “[e]xecutive power it-
self includes the power to make and interpret rules, in the course of carry-
210. Id. at 1155.
211. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50 (2011).
212. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 614-17 (2013).
213. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144-45, 1151.
214. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 297, 310 (2017).
215. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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ing out statutory responsibilities” there is no impermissible “commingling
of functions within agencies.”216
Professor Sunstein and Professor Vermeule also assert that there is no
separation of powers concern if Congress, the president, and the judiciary
“devise and approve the scheme of agency authority that combines rulemak-
ing and rule-interpreting power in the agency’s hands.”217 In other words, if
the constitutional branches agree that such power is “both valid and wise,”
then the separation of powers doctrine is not violated.218 To them, the non-
delegation argument of Seminole Rock is better construed as simply a disa-
greement over the settled authority of an agency to choose “between more
general rulemaking now and more specific interpretation or adjudication
later.”219 Thus, even if Justice Gorsuch carries his criticism of Chevron to
Seminole Rock, there are both structural differences in the separation of
power arguments and potential flaws in the argument against Seminole Rock
such that Justice Gorsuch should not be bound to follow his reasoning in
Gutierrez-Brizuela.220
Fourth, to the extent that Justice Gorsuch might feel that the Seminole
Rock doctrine leads to unfair surprise or detrimental reliance to parties, as
critics assert, he has already demonstrated that there are ways to mitigate
such results without abandoning the doctrine. For example, in Magnesium
Corp., where then-Judge Gorsuch quipped that “one might worry that ad-
ministrative law has simply abandoned regulated parties to the whims of an
agency’s arbitrary interpretive reversals,” he identified “at least two other
layers of protection” for such interests.221 He detailed how the APA’s “arbi-
trary and capricious, an abuse of direction, or otherwise not in accordance
with law” standard would apply when an agency sets forth a new adminis-
trative interpretation that creates surprise.222 He also noted that “the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would still pro-
hibit the imposition of penalties without fair notice,” which “requires at the
least that ‘laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable oppor-
tunity to know what is prohibited.’”223
216. Id. (citing United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911), stating the proposi-
tion that “statutory authority to make administrative rules is a grant of executive power, not
legislative power”).
217. Id. at 311.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 313 (discussing SEC v. Chenery Corp, 332 U.S. 194, 201-03 (1947)).
220. Id. at 312.
221. U.S. v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 2010).
222. Id. at 1144 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
223. Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)); see also U.S.
CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
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He expressly applied these principles to agency interpretations, sug-
gesting that allowing an agency to create “unfair surprise” in this fashion
would not be permitted under his watch.224 Thus, to the extent Justice Gor-
such remains concerned over such notice issues, he could continue to en-
force due process protection to mitigate or even mute any perceived over-
reach that the application of Seminole Rock allows in our administrative
state.
In sum, then-Judge Gorsuch, when discussing whether Chevron should
be reconsidered, opined that “[m]aybe the time has come to face the behe-
moth.”225 Although a case could be made that Justice Gorsuch is also ready
to “face the behemoth” of Seminole Rock, on balance, it seems more likely
that Justice Gorsuch would retain Seminole Rock and incorporate safeguards
set forth in his past opinions to address the practical and constitutional
concerns previously identified by scholars and his new colleagues.
224. Magnesium Corp., 616 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v.
Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170-71 (2007) (“[I]nterpretive changes [to regulations must] create no
unfair surprise.”)).
225. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016).
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